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Montana Law Review
VOLUME XV SPRING 1954
The Treaty-Making Power-A Real
and Present Danger
ORiE L. PHIIaIPs
Mr. President, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen:
It is a privilege I greatly esteem to be permitted to discuss
with you a subject, which, in my humble opinion, is today one
of transcendent importance: The Treaty-Making Power - A
Real and Present Danger.
At the outset, I want to make it perfectly clear that this is
not an attack upon the United Nations with respect to its primary
function of preventing aggression and maintaining peace and
order in the world. With respect to those functions, I have
ardently supported the organization, both in public addresses
and in written articles.
It may be well to preface this discussion with certain funda-
mental concepts with respect to which I think we may be in sub-
stantial agreement.
First: Our Federal government is, and should continue to
be, one of delegated and limited powers. Its powers should be
limited to matters that are national in scope and character and
matters which are essentially local in character should be reserved
to the states and the people, with the power to deal with them
in the light of peculiar local conditions and problems which differ
widely throughout the various sections of our vast country.
Second: It should not be possible through the exercise of
the treaty-making power to deprive an American citizen of any
of his fundamental rights or freedoms.
Third: It should not be possible through the exercise of
the treaty-making power to change the essential nature of our
*Chief Judge, 10th Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. Address delivered
before Montana State Bar Association, Great Falls, Montana, August 14,
1953.
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government nor to delegate to any international organization any
of the legislative, executive and judicial powers that by our
Federal Constitution are respectively vested in the Congress, the
President and the national courts.
I trust my approach to the subject at hand will not be that
of a partisan. I shall endeavor to speak from the viewpoint of
an American, an American who loves his country and its institu-
tions, who is deeply appreciative of the opportunities, liberties
and privileges he has enjoyed and who is genuinely concerned
about the future welfare of his country.
Perhaps the question arises in your mind: Why does the
treaty-making power under provisions of our Federal Constitu-
tion, which have not been changed since its adoption, now give
rise to questions of supreme importance? There are three rea-
sons:
(1) In what is otherwise a government of limited and dele-
gated powers under the Constitution, no express limitation exists
on the treaty power, and the existence of any implied limitations
is shrouded in doubt;
(2) A basic change of viewpoint has developed with respect
to the functions and purposes of treaties. A veritable avalanche
of new treaties is under consideration by the United Nations and
its affiliated organizations in the social, economic, cultural civil
and political fields; and 7
(3) Persistent efforts have been made during the past two
decades to find additional constitutional basis for expansion of
the powers of the Federal government, and the treaty power has
been seized upon as a conveniently available vehicle for such ex-
pansion.
The issue presented is whether a constitutional amendment
limiting the treaty-making power is necessary to preserve the
reserved powers of the states and the principle of local self-
government, to insure that the essential character of our national
government shall not be changed except by the constitutional
process of amendment, and to safeguard the rights and liberties
of our people.
Until recently it was a fundamental concept of international
law that it is a law befween states and not between individuals
or between individuals and states.
A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations
and depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the honor
of the governments which are parties to it. If dishonored, its in-
fraction becomes the subject of international reclamation and
negotiation. At the time the Constitution was adopted and until
2
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recently, treaties entered into by the United States generally
were compacts in that primary sense, imposing duties and ob-
ligations on the contracting states and not on individual citizens.
Mr. Hamilton, in The Federalist, No. 75, referring to the
treaty power, said:
"It relates neither to the execution of the subsist-
ing laws, nor to the enaction of new ones; * * *. Its
objects are contracts with foreign nations, which have
the force of law, but derive it from the obligations of
good faith. They are not rules prescribed by the so-
vereign to the subject, but agreements between so-
vereign and sovereign."
Mr. Jefferson, in his Manual of Parliamentary Practice, had
this to say:
"By the general power to make treaties, the Con-
stitution must have intended to comprehend only those
objects which are usually regulated by treaties, and can-
not be otherwise regulated.
"It must have meant to except out all those rights
reserved to the states; for surely the President and the
Senate cannot do by treaty what the whole government
is interdicted from doing in any way."
But that view ceased to prevail with the decision of the
Supreme Court in Missouri v. Holland,1 dealing with the Migra-
tory Bird Treaty with Canada, as I shall presently show.
This brings me to a consideration of the provisions of our
Federal Constitution with respect to the treaty-making power.
Article II, Section 2, Paragraph 2, of the United States Con-
stitution provides:
"He [the President] shall have Power, by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,
provided two thirds of the Senators present con-
cur; * * * ,,
It will be observed that the grant of power is general and
the limitation is only on the manner of its exercise.
Article VI, Paragraph 2, of the United States Constitution
provides:
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
'252 U.S. 416, 432, 433.
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Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
It will be observed that under this provision, laws of the
United States are the supreme law of the land, only if made in
pursuance of the Constitution; while treaties are declared to be
the supreme law of the land, if they are made under the author-
ity of the United States.
The last paragraph of Section 8 of Article I of the Constitu-
tion grants to Congress the power to make all laws necessary
and proper for carrying into execution its enumerated powers
and "all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Govern-
ment of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof." Under that provision, the Congress may enact laws to
implement and carry into effect a treaty made under the author-
ity of the United States, although it would not have power under
the Constitution to enact such laws in the absence of the treaty.
Such was the holding of the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Hol-
land,' where the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of July 3, 1918, and
the regulations made by the Secretary of Agriculture in pursu-
ance thereof came before the Supreme Court. In its opinion the
court referred to two prior cases holding that an earlier act of
Congress which attempted by itself, and not in pursuance of a
treaty, to regulate the killing of migratory birds within the states
was invalid, and stated:
"Whether the two cases cited were decided rightly
or not they cannot be. accepted as a test of the treaty
power. Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the
land only when made in pursuance of the Constitution,
while treaties are declared to be so when made under the
authority of the United States. * * * there may be mat-
ters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being
that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a
treaty followed by such an act could, * * * "
and upheld the validity of the Congressional enactment imple-
menting the treaty.
In an address before the American Society of International
Law, on April 26, 1929, the late Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes said that the treaty-making power "has no explicit
limitation attached to it" and that "there has been no disposition
to find in anything relating to the external concerns of the nation
2252 U.S. 416, 432, 433.
'40 Stat. 755.
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a limitation to be implied. * * * But if we attempted to use the
treaty-making power to deal with matters which did not pertain
to our external relations but to control matters which normally
and appropriately were within the local jurisdictions of the
States, then I again say there might be ground for implying a
limitation upon the treaty-making power that it is intended for
the purpose of having treaties made relating to foreign affairs
and not to make laws for the people of the United States in their
internal concerns through the exercise of the asserted treaty-
making power." But he also said: "I should not care to voice
any opinion as to an implied limitation on the treaty power. The
Supreme Court has expressed a doubt whether there could be
any such."
Moreover, the State Department, during the preceding ad-
ministration, took a position contrary to the implied limitation
suggested by the late Chief Justice. In a statement released by
the State Department, in September, 1950, it said:
"There is no longer any real distinction between
'domestic' and 'foreign' affairs."'
The growing tendency to undertake to create a basis for Con
gressional enactments under the treaty-making power, not within
the Constitutional grant of legislative power in the absence of a
treaty, is indicated by the Report of President Truman's Com-
mittee on Civil Rights, from which I quote:
"Thae Human Rights Commission of the United Na-
tions at present is working on a detailed international
bill of rights designed to give more specific meaning to
the general principles announced in Article 55 of the
Charter: If this document is accepted by the United
States as a member state, an even stronger base for con-
gressional action under the treaty power may be estab-
lished." Report of Civil Rights Committee, Par. 10.
Should the United States become a party to the Covenant on
Human Rights, then under the doctrine of Missouri v. Holland,
Congress could take over the entire field of human rights and
completely upset the normal division between state and Federal
power in that field.
Moreover, in addition to creating broad power to enact im-
plementing legislation by Congress, a treaty itself, if self-execut-
ing by its terms, may have the force and effect of a legislative
enactment affecting matters of local concern and traditionally
regarded as within the reserved powers -of the states. A self-
'State Department Publication 3972, Foreign Affairs Policy Series 26.
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executing treaty, in addition to being an international contract,
becomes municipal, viz., local, law of the United States in each
of the several states and the judges of each state are bound
thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of their state to the
contrary nothwithstanding.'
Only in the United States does a self-executing treaty be-
come municipal law without enabling legislation. Any other na-
tion which enters into a treaty becomes bound thereby under in-
ternational law, but the treaty does not become internal law in
such nation, imposing duties or obligations upon its citizens, un-
less it is implemented by legislation enacted in accordance with
its constitutional processes.
May I refer briefly to some of the proposed treaties which,
if entered into, will affect individual rights and freedoms of our
citizens or impose civil and criminal liability on individuals. To-
day, affiliated agencies of the United Nations have under con-
sideration in excess of 150 proposed treaties dealing with a multi-
tude of subjects, most of which have heretofore been regarded as
within the reserved powers of the states. At least 17 of such
treaties are in the drafting stage-not by the Secretary of State,
but by such affiliated agencies. Time will not permit a detailed
discussion of many of these treaties.
One is the Covenant on Human Rights, to which I have al-
ready referred. With respect to that treaty, in an article pub-
lished in the January, 1948, issue of the Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Mr. John P. Humphrey,
a Canadian, and the Director of the Division of Human Rights
of the United Nations, said:
"What the United Nations is trying to do is revolu-
tionary in character. Human rights are largely a mat-
ter of relationships between the state and individuals,
and therefore a matter which has been traditionally re-
garded as being within the domestic jurisdiction of
states. What is now being proposed is, in effect, the
creation of some kind of supernational supervision of
this relationship between the state and its citizens."
Another is the proposed Convention on Gathering and In-
ternational Transmission of News and Right of Correction. With
respect to that treaty, Mr. Carroll Binder, a Minneapolis news-
paperman, says:
"There is no possibility of substantially increasing
freedom of information through the United Nations un-
5Valentine v. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 10;
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194.
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der present conditions. On the contrary, there is danger
that encroachment upon freedom of information now
practiced by individual sovereign states may obtain legal
or moral sanction through United Nations instruments
or declarations."
The danger to which he refers arises from the fact that such
Convention, as well as the Convention on Human Rights, as pro-
posed, contains limitations subjecting the rights dealt with there-
in to penalties, liabilities, and restrictions for the protection of
the national security, public order, safety, health and morals.
The treaty with Israel, which was transmitted to the Senate
by President Truman, provides that nationals of either country
shall not be barred from practicing professions in the other
country by reason of their being aliens, if they comply with other
requirements, such as residence and competence. Under the most
favored nation clause, included in many treaties to which the
United States is a party, the above provision in the Israel treaty,
if it goes into effect, would be automatically applicable to the
nationals of a very large number of countries. This is a typical
example of an invasion of the reserved powers of the states.
Another of these treaties is the Genocide Convention now
before the Senate for ratification.
I am not unmindful that in the past, acts, which this Con-
vention undertakes to define as international crimes, have been
perpetrated against human groups, which shocked the conscience
of mankind, were contrary to moral law, and were abhorrent to
all persons who have a proper and decent regard for the dignity
of human beings, regardless of the national, ethnical, racial, or
religious groups to which they belong, and that the end sought to
be attained by this Convention is wholly desirable. But, the
definitions of Genocide in the Convention are vague and lacking
in precision. They do not lay down a certain and understandable
rule of conduct. A statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applica-
tion, violates the first essential of due process of law.'
Moreover, the Genocide Convention proposes ultimately to
vest in an international criminal tribunal jurisdiction to try, con-
vict, and sentence American citizens charged with the offense of
Genocide, without the safeguards which our Federal and State
Constitutions guarantee to persons charged with domestic crimes.
A separate ad hoc United Nations committee has prepared
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 885, 391.
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a draft Convention for the establishment of an international
criminal court. It is significant that this statute expressly de-
prives a defendant of the right to be tried by a jury of his peers
in the district in which the offense is charged to have been com-
mitted-a right we regard as fundamental, and affords no pro-
tection against the use of an involuntary confession as evidence
against the accused, a device almost universally resorted to in the
trial of persons accused of crime in the police states.
The Warsaw Convention drastically limits the liability for
negligence resulting in death or personal injury to passengers on
international airplane flights, although the accident occurs with-
in the territorial limits of the United States.
The proposed Rome Convention would drastically limit lia-
bility for damages to persons and property on the earth's surface,
resulting from the crash of an airplane on an international flight,
although the crash occurs within the territorial limits of the
United States-a crash damaging your airport, for example.
What is the answer to our problem? For more than three
years the Committee of the American Bar Association on Peace
and Law Through United Nations, a committee on which I have
been privileged to serve since its creation, has engaged in a study
of this problem. At the Mid-Winter Meeting of the American
Bar Association, in 1952, the committee reported to the House of
Delegates a proposed Constitutional amendment, which the House
adopted on February 26, 1952. Senate Joint Resolution No. 1,
as revised and approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee on
June 4, 1953, by a vote of 10 to 4, incorporates without substan-
tial change the American Bar Association proposal, and reads as
follows:
"Section 1. A provision of a treaty which conflicts
with this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect.
"Section 2. A treaty shall become effective as in-
ternal law in the United States only through legislation
which would be valid in the absence of treaty.
"Section 3. Congress shall have power to regulate
all executive and other agreements with any foreign
power or international organization. All such agree-
ments shall be subject to the limitations imposed on
treaties by this article.
"Section 4. The Congress shall have power to en-
force this article by appropriate legislation.
"Section 5. This article shall be inoperative unless
it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Con-
stitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the sev-
8
Montana Law Review, Vol. 15 [1954], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol15/iss1/1
THE TREATY MAKING POWER
eral States within seven years from the date of its sub-
mission. "
If adopted, the amendment will prevent a treaty from becom-
ing internal law in the United States by force of its self-execut-
ing terms; it will modify the holding of Missouri v. Holland, and
restrict the power of Congress in enacting legislation to imple-
ment a treaty to the legislative powers that it would have in the
absence of such treaty; and it will establish the supremacy of
the Constitution over treaty law.
Certain arguments have been advanced by opponents of this
proposal. Among them are: (1) That the dangers to which we
have referred are hypothetical; (2) that bad or dangerous
treaties will be prevented by Senate non-concurrence; (3) that
the present administration will not make or press for concurrence
by the Senate the treaties to which I have referred; (4) that a
bad treaty can be nullified by subsequent legislation; and (5)
that the proposal would handicap the conduct of our foreign rela-
tions.
Our distinguished Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, stated, in
effect, at the hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee, on April 6, last, that he had checked the danger-
ous trend of the State Department in the treaty field and that our
proposed amendment is unnecessary and itself dangerous.
I want to read to you what he said in an address at Louis-
ville, Kentucky, on April 12, 1952. I quote:
"The treaty-making power is an extraordinary
power liable to abuse. Treaties make international law
and also they make domestic law. Under our Constitu-
tion treaties become the supreme law of the land. They
are indeed more supreme than ordinary laws, for con-
gressional laws are invalid if they do not conform to the
Constitution, whereas treaty law can override the con-
stitution. Treaties, for example, can take powers away
from the Congress and give them to the President; they
can take powers from the state and give them to the Fed-
eral Government or to some international body and they
can cut across the rights given the people by the con-
stitutional Bill of Rights." (Italics mine.)
The argument he made on April 6 has a striking parallel in
our Constitutional history. When the issue of whether the first
ten amendments to the Federal Constitution, commonly called
the Bill of Rights, should be added to the Constitution was being
debated, Hamilton, in the 184 Federalist, made the argument
9
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that a Bill of Rights was both unnecessary and dangerous. Thank
God, his views did not prevail in that great debate.
May I take up the first sentence of the text proposed by the
American Bar Association: "A provision of a treaty which con-
flicts with any provision of this Constitution shall not be of any
force or effect." It is true there are certain statements in deci-
sions of the Supreme Court, which are pure dicta, to the effect
that a treaty which violates the Constitution or is inconsistent
with the nature of our government or the relation between the
states and the United States would be invalid.' But, those prop-
ositions have never been laid down in any decision that arises, as
distinguished from mere dicta, to the dignity of judicial preced-
ent. And other pronouncements of the courts cast doubt on the
existence of such limitations and on the power of the Supreme
Court to hold a treaty invalid, which has been made under the
authority of the United States and consented to by the Senate in
accordance with the Constitutional process.!
No one, so far as I am advised, has been bold enough to as-
sert that a treaty which violates the Constitution should be valid.
What possible objection then can there be to a Constitutional
amendment affirmatively declaring that "a provision of a treaty
which conflicts with any provision of this Constitution shall not
be of any force or effect' '-removing any possible doubt of the
supremacy of the Constitution over treaty law?
The second sentence of the American Bar Association's pro-
posal reads: "A treaty shall become effective as internal law in
the United States only through legislation which would be valid
in the absence of treaty."
To that provision objection has been raised by the Secretary
of State and others on the ground that it would unreasonably
limit the powers of the Federal government in the international
field.
It should be noted particularly that the American Bar Asso-
7Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341;
Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. 211, 243;
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267.
8There are judicial expressions to the effect that what the President and
Senate do in foreign relations is a political question "not subject to
judicial inquiry or decision." Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S.
297, 302 (1918) ; U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) ;
U.S. v. Sandoval 167 U.S. 278; U.S. v. Domestic Fuel Corporation, 71
F.2d 424, 430-J31; Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d
438, 442; Z. & F. Assets Realization Corporation v. Hull, 114 F. 2d 464,
468. And there are other judicial expressions found in the adjudicated
cases from Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, 237 (1796), to U.S. v. Reid, 9
Cir., 73 F.2d 153, that "It is doubtful whether the courts have the power
to declare the plain terms of a treaty unconstitutional."
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ciation's proposed amendment does not prevent the President
and the Senate from making a treaty, otherwise valid under the
Constitution, on any subject whatsoever, and renders all such
treaties effective externally. But, the proposal prevents such a
treaty from becoming effective as internal law in the United
States, except to the extent that Congress legislates within its
delegated powers in the absence of such treaty.
The United States can enter into treaties to preserve peace
and prevent aggression and war, for mutual defense, for reduc-
tion in armaments, for control of atomic energy and atomic
weapons, and with respect to other related matters to insure our
continued existence as a nation and the preservation of our liber-
ties, and the Congress, under the war power, which the Supreme
Court has said is "well-nigh limitless," and under its power to
provide for the national defense, can implement such treaties by
legislation. Under its power "to regulate commerce with for-
eign nations," Congress can implement treaties of friendship,
commerce and navigation-a field which embraces a large por-
tion of the treaties negotiated between the nations. Congress has
the power "to define and punish piracies and offenses on the high
seas and offenses against the law of nations." Under that pow-
er, Congress can implement treaties dealing with such offenses
or can define and provide for the punishment of such offenses
without any antecedent treaty. The foregoing are but illustra-
tions, which could be multiplied in other fields, and such treaties
will become the supreme law of the land and effective internally
through legislation enacted by Congress, legislating within its
well-settled delegated powers.
All of the classes of treaties to which I have just referred can
be implemented effectively without state action because they all
fall within the delegated powers of Congress in the absence of
treaty; and I respectfully submit that any assertion to the con-
trary is utterly unsound.
It may be that the proposed amendment would exclude some
small areas in which treaties are now made or proposed. But
that presents no insoluble problem. The end can be attained by
cooperation between the Federal government and the states.
Such a procedure would give due recognition to the reserved
powers of the states. It has been followed in treaties entered
into by the United States. Under the Consular Convention with
France of 1853, the interpretation of which was involved in
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, the rights of Frenchmen to own,
possess and enjoy personal and real property in the several states
of the United States were made to depend upon legislative action
11
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by the states, and the rights of citizens of the United States to
own, possess and enjoy personal and real property in France were
made to depend upon such reciprocal action by our states.
Likewise, in the treaty with China, signed November 4, 1946,
and effective November 30, 1948, the rights of Chinese nationals,
corporations and associations to acquire, hold and dispose of real
property in the several states of the United States were made to
depend upon legislation by such states, and the rights of na-
tionals, corporations and associations of the United States to
acquire, hold or dispose of real property in China were condi-
tioned upon reciprocal legislative action by the state of the
United States in which such national of the United States is
domiciled, or in which such corporation or association of the
United States was created or organized.
However, it should be kept in mind that the "which clause"
has absolutely no application unless the treaty would affect
domestic law not otherwise within Federal legislative competence.
Only when the treaty would affect domestic law beyond Federal
legislative competence in the absence of treaty, would the "which
clause" have any effect. Only then would state legislation be
necessary.
Another groundless objection urged by opponents of the
proposed amendment is that it would subject troops or war ves-
sels of a friendly nation, stationed in or moving through the
territory of the United States, to the limitations and impedi-
ments of state law. They envision an enemy invading the
United States by way of Alaska and a Canadian motorized divi-
sion being rushed to our aid through United States territory and
imagine dire consequences that would arise from impediments of
state law. But their fears are wholly groundless. It was settled
by Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange v. McFad-
don, 7 Cranch., 11 U.S. 116, that troops and warships of a
friendly nation, stationed within or passing through our terri-
tory, are entitled to the immunities of the sovereign himself and
his diplomatic representatives while in our country, and that
they are subject only to their own country's laws and regula-
tions, and are not in anywise subject to our local law.
It is asserted that the proposed amendment would probably
prevent the United States from entering into an agreement em-
bracing the Baruch Plan to control atomic energy.
As stated above, the Federal government possesses today,
under its specific war powers and its power to provide for the
national defense, ample Constitutional authority to legislate con-
12
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trol of atomic energy. Furthermore, it has done so. (Atomic
Energy Act of August 1, 1946.)
No treaty on the subject, therefore, whether made before or
after the adoption of the proposed amendment would be invalid,
unless as an incident to its control measures it involved such a
surrender of sovereign powers of the United States to an inter-
national or supranational organization as would be condemned
as an unconstitutional bartering away of those powers. The
Supreme Court has said:
"The powers of government are delegated in trust
to the United States, and are incapable of transfer to
any other parties. They cannot be abandoned or sur-
rendered * * *. The exercise of these public trusts is not
the subject of barter or contract." (Chinese Exclusion
Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609.)
An effective system of international inspection to prevent
violation of a treaty on atomic energy would not be objectionable
on this ground.
The Baruch proposal, advanced seven years ago, however,
consisted of a general outline, of which international inspection
was but an incident. Under it absolute ownership and control of
all fissionable material and of its uses, both military and civilian,
as well as of the sources and potential sources of the raw mate-
rials, would have been surrendered by the United States to a
supranational body in which, although contributing the maxi-
mum in atomic properties and developments, the United States
would have had at most a small minority representation, and
which would have been completely free of any authority of the
United States government. (Mr. Baruch's Statement, June 14,
1946, Dept. of State Pub. 2702, pp. 138-147; United States
Memoranda 1, 2 and 3, 1. c. pp. 148-165.)
In so far as such a plan, envisaging complete abrogation of
the sovereignty of the United States in favor of a supranational
world organization, might achieve constitutionality through the
treaty-making power, it would and should be barred by §1 of the
proposed amendment.
T~he subject matter of the Baruch proposal, advanced in
1946, has now been combined by the General Assembly of the
United Nations by resolution of April 8, 1953, with a larger study
of disarmament. (State Dept. Bulletin, April 20, 1953, p. 584.)
Any plan involving surrender of the sovereign governmental
powers of the United States to what must inevitably become a
supranational body having control of the world, should not be
13
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effected by treaty, and should be possible only through un-
equivocal change in our Constitution, achieved through the af-
firmative voice of the people of the entire nation.
The statement of Mr. Dulles that he has checked the danger-
ous trend of the State Department in the treaty field is reas-
suring for the moment. But what of the future ? Who knows or
can predict what position future administrations will take with
respect to these dangerous treaties? The time to lock the barn
is before the horse is stolen. The admonition of Thomas Jeffer-
son should be ever kept in mind:
"In questions of power, let no more be said of con-
fidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the
chains of the Constitution. "
The argument that the Senate will stop dangerous or unde-
sirable treaties by withholding concurrence is equally without
validity and is controverted by the fact that Senator Bricker and
64 other Senators as co-sponsors have introduced a joint resolu-
tion to limit the treaty-making power.
The suggestion that a bad treaty can be abrogated by a sub-
sequent legislative act overlooks the fact that such treaty must
have been proposed by the President and concurred in by two-
thirds of the Senators present and that to override a presidential
veto of the abrogating legislation would take a two-thirds vote of
the Senate and House. 'Moreover, we should not be put in the
position of welching on a treaty we have solemnly entered into.
We have heretofore in our history castigated another nation for
regarding a treaty as a mere scrap of paper.
It is my firm conviction, after careful and painstaking con-
sideration of the problem, that only by proper restriction of the
treaty-making power, through Constitutional amendment, can
we be sure that the essential character of our national govern-
ment, the rights of the states and the people, and the precious
liberties and fundamental freedoms of the individual citizen will
be safeguarded and preserved.
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